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The UNDP conception of Human Development 

‘Human development’ language spread gradually in circles of national and international development policy and planning from the 1970s and acquired a definitive form in the 1990s in the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Reports (HDRs). Human development was defined as extension of people’s capability, the range of alternatives which they can attain and have reason to (favourably) value. 

The initiator of the reports was the Pakistani development economist and planner Mahbub ul Haq (1934-98). Haq had been an apostle of overriding priority to economic growth and industrialisation when based in Pakistan’s Planning Commission in the 1960s. He observed there that despite economic growth of 6-7% p.a. through the decade, priority aspects of human welfare were untouched. Social tensions in Pakistan brought the disintegration of the country in 1971, and hobbled its growth for the next decade. Working through the 1970s as Director of the World Bank’s Policy Planning Department Haq gradually widened his conception of development, in consultation with a global network of academics and policymakers. In the World Bank he promoted work on basic needs, viewed as food, water, clothing, shelter, health and education [see entry on needs]. In retrospect this work was seen as having some fundamental limitations. First, a preoccupation with material inputs rather than more broadly with how people can live; second, a further materialistic bias, in the sense of neglecting aspirations for freedom, equality, dignity, democracy and voice, including in determining what are basic priorities and how they should be pursued; third, an associated technocratic bias towards central expert decision on priorities, marginalising local knowledge and values; fourth, an alleged downgrading of value differences, and a making of arbitrary universal standard prioritisations; fifth, a style of deficiency thinking, focused on what people lack rather than on their assets and abilities; sixth, presentation in a condescending separate language for the poor, and lack of a wider perspective to inspire and guide. These criticisms do not apply to other basic needs approaches, such as the ‘Human Scale Development’ of Manfred Max-Neef and his school, which are discussed in the entry on needs. They apply to types of needs-based development planning by many governments and international agencies in the 1950s to early 1980s; and were used in the 1980s to downgrade such planning in favour of approaches which left prioritisation to markets.

During the mid and late 1980s Haq and associates considered and responded to these limitations and arrived at the formulation of ‘Human Development’ which was instituted in the first Human Development Report in 1990 (Gasper 2007a). Its theoretical base includes the capability approach (see below and separate entry) and a broader humanism (see separate entry), which have led to a style of policy analysis structured by concerns of human welfare. The notion of a person’s capability is comparable to the notion of a consumption possibility set, with important differences. The alternatives in a capability set are not commodity bundles, but instead patterns of life, bundles of functionings; so the perspective is broader, covering far more than commodities, let alone only material goods, and deeper, by looking at being, not merely at having. This responds to the first and second limitations mentioned above. The main ‘currency’ of evaluation adopted is capability: the range of valued opportunities to function, leaving it to people themselves to choose from these opportunities. In response to the third and fourth objections above, there is an emphasis on reasoned valuation, not a priori specification. In emphasising reasoned valuation and choice, the approach embodies a concern for human agency, rather than a donative orientation of top-down provision. In response to the fifth and sixth objections there is now a general perspective that, like humanist economics as a whole, is not restricted to poor countries and poor groups and offers a unifying vision centered on respecting freedom and giving real substance to it. 

Haq (1998) summed up ‘human development’ as development for, by, and of people. Thus it includes humane priorities, thoroughgoing participation, and ‘human resource development’. It is to be people-centred, rather than for a sub-group or of an abstraction; and the opposite of an ‘inhuman development’ that excludes some or most people, even from fulfilment of their most basic needs, and which measures performance by how much is bought and sold, regardless of its composition (for example, whether it is music or weaponry), or its distribution, use or relationship to people’s particular requirements, and regardless too of its neglect of (and sometimes major negative impacts on) many of the important non-commodified goods and bads in life. Strong economic growth in a country is easily combined with lack of adequate nourishment and clean water for much of its population, notably for young children, to the extent of permanently damaging their mental and physical capacity and life quantity and quality. Indeed the growing incomes of some groups often raise prices and reduce access for poor groups, and generate their physical displacement. By focusing on priority functionings, not money categories alone, Haq and others could show there was scope for enormous beneficial impact through reallocations within the budgets of low-income countries and international aid agencies. This was already clear from the experience of countries like Costa Rica and Sri Lanka (Dreze and Sen 1989), but the Human Development approach has given a general framework for analysis and policy. It includes strong emphases on participation and empowerment, in their own right and as politically essential in order to initiate and sustain this sort of equitable strategy.

Overall, the UNDP approach refocuses development thinking upon fundamental valued ends and valued means, and access thereto, not only monetized means; and reinstates development as a normative concept distinct from economic growth and social change, whose value content must be assessed not presumed. The reconceptualisation has broadened the range of objectives routinely considered in development debate and planning. UNDP’s standard definition of dimensions of human development has covered: (1) empowerment, meaning the expansion of capabilities (ability to attain valued ends), expansion of valued functionings (attained valued ends), and participation (sharing in specifying priorities); (2) equity in distribution of basic capabilities; and (3) sustainability and (4) security of people’s valued attainments and opportunities. The significance of this approach and the sister work is that they embody and institutionalise a fundamental theme in earlier humanist economics and humanist thought, namely that development means promotion of human values.

The emergence of ‘human development’ ideas 

The language of ‘human development’, applied at societal and global levels and not only at individual level, dates from at least the 1960s. Use of the term to describe the maturation and evolution of individual persons dates from much earlier in developmental and educational psychology. Writers like Donald Warwick (1968), a social psychologist, began to investigate what was the value content of the term ‘development’ when used as a normative category applied to local and national societies. In the 1950s and 60s ‘development’ had been typically equated to sustained economic growth and transformation, or to ‘modernization’, a series of arguably connected structural changes including urbanization, commercialization, industrialization, secularization and individualization. As people increasingly saw that there were choices of and in ‘(economic) development’ and ‘modernization’—that there is not one sole path for progress and that no country offers an ideal model—they came to ask: development of what and towards what? Options exist for which goals societies develop towards and how societies develop towards given goals. Recognition of multiple distinct aspects of quality of life grew, leading to conclusions such as that of Roland Colin: ‘There is no longer any country which can pretend to consider itself developed, that is, humanly developed’ (1968: 4). This perception grew in part through Northerners returning home after periods of work in the South, argued the development ethicist Denis Goulet (1931-2006). 

Already in 1960 Goulet wrote that ‘development’ means ‘changes which allow human beings, both as individual persons and as members of groups, to move from one condition of life to one which is more human in some meaningful way’ (1960: 14). Development concerns ‘being more’, not merely having more. In his view, ‘The only development that is worthy of man’ (p.15) included self-restraint in having, given the competition often between having and being. To ‘keep their liberty, people must know how to free themselves from excessive attachment to superfluous goods’ (p.15). Later such work holds that people’s autonomy requires avoiding subjection to consumption standards and wants that are spread from or by more affluent groups, intentionally or otherwise (Rahman 1992). Goulet made the theme of ‘human development’ explicit: ‘what kind of development can be considered “human”?’ (1971: 236). His seminal The Cruel Choice declared: ‘The aim of this work is to thrust debates over economic and social development into the arena of ethical values. … Is human development something more than a systemic combination of modern bureaucracy, efficient technology, and productive economy?’ (1971: vii). Development’s ‘ultimate goals are those of existence itself : to provide all men with the opportunity to lead full human lives’ (1971: x). He presented an ideal of ‘full, comprehensive human development’ (1979: 105), and praised the Sri Lankan Sarvodaya movement’s ‘concept of human development…[based on] respect for all life and the concept of the well-being of all’ (1979: 109). A concept of development as the improvement of people’s life quality contains no a priori declaration about what are desirable means, unlike equation of development to economic growth or social modernization or a supposed pre-industrial rural idyll. It does not romanticize North or South, nor demonize either. Rather it directs attention to the content of human lives and opens up discussion of the range of criteria for assessing them.

The forerunners of such work lie in the tradition of humanistic economics and humanist critique of mainstream economics: Jean Sismondi (1773-1842), for whom ‘the increase in wealth is not the end in political economy, but its instrument in procuring the happines of all’ (cited by Lutz & Lux 1998: 65); John Ruskin (1819-1900), who emphasised reasoned use values and the quality of work, and who inspired Gandhi; J.A. Hobson (1855-1940); E.F. Schumacher (1911-77); and R.H. Tawney (1880-1962), who defined the humanistic tradition in terms of its treatment of material inputs and wealth ‘as means to an end, and that this end is the growth towards perfection of individual human beings’ (cited by Lutz 1992a: 98). Lutz called this ‘a welfare standard explicitly expressed in terms of human welfare rather than “economic” or “social welfare”’ (1992a: 103), in other words not in terms of a supposed ‘utility’ category imputed from market choices. He highlighted the additional “a priori ethical assumption of human equality” (p.103) and an insistence on assuring the welfare of all. The ‘human welfare’ notion uses a picture of a scale of human values, from basic material needs through a range of higher aspirations for expression, self-realization and dignity. In Lutz’s formulation this welfare standard became ‘material sufficiency and human dignity for all’ (1992b: 166), further summarized as respect for basic human rights. The humanist economics tradition, together with the humanistic psychology of authors like Eric Fromm (1900-80), contributed to the milieu in which the ideas of Goulet, Warwick and similar authors emerged. These in turn provided the context for emergence of the contemporary ‘human development’ school in economics and development studies and policy. 

A comprehensive, people-centred approach to analysis and policy

UNDP’s Human Development conception has had wide influence. It contains various elements: a form of open systems policy analysis, with a distinctive treatment of policy means and means-ends connections, not only of policy ends; a form of humanism with an agenda of mutual concern and public ethical discourse; and corresponding methodological and theoretical wings, in addition to those for measurement and modelling. Contrary to Srinivasan (1994), it involves far more than an extended list of objectives and a capability denominator (Gasper 2002).

The Indian economist Amartya Sen (1933-) gave a conceptual basis. In between the two sets of concepts which were conventional in welfare economics—inputs to living such as income and commodities, and subjective responses, often called ‘utility’—a third set was introduced, including: Lancaster’s concept of characteristics of goods; the characteristics of people; people’s capability to function; and their functionings. This gives a language with which to discuss the contents of people’s lives and the extent of their freedoms, not just the economic inputs to the lives (owning, earning, spending), or the mental-state outputs of preference fulfilment or feeling good or bad. It encourages attention to far more types of information than in earlier economics work on welfare and policy. Which of the levels deserve priority as well-being measures? Not commodity acquisition, because different people have different needs; and not (solely) feelings of satisfaction, or the fact of preference fulfilment, because preferences may be formed under situations of deprivation of information and of options. Sen (1993) advocates that we stress instead functionings, how people actually live, and, especially (in order to emphasize freedom) capability (the functionings-bundles they can attain), the life options they have. 

The popular slogan that ‘development is the enlargement of human capabilities’ carries a danger, if not all capabilities are good. Which capabilities, why and to what end? Various authors speak of capability as ability to achieve what one wishes, but Sen speaks more cautiously of people's abilities to lead the lives they have reason to value. Obscurities remain in the terms ‘people’ and ‘they’, and the ‘we’ in ‘we have reason to value’. For the public goods which are central in human development the associated reasoning must be group reasoning and prioritisations must be through group processes. The formulations require also that people are well equipped to reason. Further, not all widening of the range of options, even of desired options, improves well-being. The psychology literature (e.g. Schwartz 2005) supports the philosophical arguments of Goulet, Rahman et al. here. The sister slogan ‘Development as freedom’ (Sen 1999) carries similar dangers. Not all freedoms are good and not only freedoms are important (Gasper & van Staveren 2003). The slogan can be misused to defend a consumerist orientation of indiscriminate economic growth. Sen initially declared ‘Freedom is the principal end and principal means of development’ (1999: xii) but modified this to say it is ‘one of’ the principal ends and principal means (Dreze & Sen 2002: 4). Haq used a safer formulation, that people are the key means as well as the valued end in development processes.

As an approach in policy analysis, for purposes both of explanation of the levels of fulfilment of valued ends and for design of policy responses, Haq and Sen stressed that the human development approach considers all relevant factors and means, without restriction on disciplinary grounds. It is a comprehensive and thereby potentially radical framework. It stresses popular empowerment as a method, for example. In explanation too, Haq led a rejection of partitioned thinking: the analysis of processes and connections only within disciplinary and national boundaries. He espoused and illustrated ‘joined-up thinking’ not limited by those boundaries. Economic policies for example can have major impacts on conflict and violence (as in the case of the Rwanda 1994 genocide; Eriksson et al. 1996), the flow of arms and the creation or strengthening of international crime networks, disease, migration, international epidemics, and more. Haq and the Human Development Reports advised rich countries of the necessity for their own structural adjustment programmes, by opening markets and thereby promoting global social stability rather than belatedly sending expensive and ineffective peace-keeping or punitive forces.	

The human development approach involves not only wide-ranging specifications of values and causes—and thus of ends and means—it uses values of human welfare to structure and guide analysis. The broader range of values, focused on how people do and can live, guides choices of topics and boundaries of analysis, and some other matters, with priority given to the socio-economic significance of findings not merely statistical significance. It has become a form of policy analysis that uses, and is guided by, human development values (Gasper 2008).

One aspect of this deserves special mention. As in human rights philosophy, the field of reference is all humans, wheresoever in the world. Unlike in market calculations, we do not focus only on those with purchasing power, let alone weighted according to their purchasing power. Global ethics arises as a topic of attention, for example in UNDP’s work on global public goods, in the human development ethics of Martha Nussbaum, which stresses global responsibilities and solidarity, and in the growing connection of the human development approach to the human rights movement (Nussbaum 2006).

Nussbaum (1947-), an American classicist, moral philosopher and social critic, connects the humanist strand in economics to older strands in philosophy and the humanities. While Sen rethought ‘development’ as concerning the increase of freedoms to do and be, Nussbaum brings a closer attention to ‘human’, a focus on development as the promotion of human dignity, and a fuller conceptualisation of capability (Nussbaum 2000). Sen’s concept of capability modifies the notion of a consumption possibilities set. Nussbaum, like for example Warwick, distinguishes: 1) the person’s inborn potentials; 2) the person’s skills and attitudes, arising from his/her potentials and experience; and 3) the person’s environment. The interaction of the last two generates: 4) capability in Sen’s sense. The second category matches much everyday and professional usage of the term ‘capability’, and is essential since we need to identify and influence relevant skills and attitudes. Nussbaum’s form of human development theory is found useful by many analysts of education. It involves close attention to the contents of people’s lives, while looking at whole lives. This contributes to, she argues: seeing each person as distinct, and deserving respect and concern; thinking hard about what is similar and what is different in their lives; and generating a picture of major aspects of life that each deserve respect and protection. Nussbaum’s picture of human development thus uses a ‘capabilities approach’, more concrete than Sen’s ‘capability approach’. It is close in character to the human rights approach, and identifies a series of basic capabilities—including for a full life span, health, practical reason, affiliation and political participation—needed for a life with dignity.

Methodologically, authors like Nussbaum bring in methods of the humanities, to add to those of more impersonal social sciences: studies of and testimony from the situations and life-stories of individuals (e.g. Narayan et al. 2000), from novels (Nussbaum 1995), plays, films and reflective essays. These methods and sources support deeper understanding and also broader and stronger attention, sympathy, and response. Nussbaum’s work looks in depth at emotions and motivation (e.g. Nussbaum, 2001), and—given the limits to how altruistic most people may become, and limits to how strong people may become as reasoners, negotiators and free agents—at legal guarantees for some basic capabilities for everyone, not leaving everything open for decision in a supposedly democratic political process that can in reality be dominated by the rich and by the implications of wealth and poverty.

Finally, Nussbaum replies to objections that the ‘human development’ concept and  approach overgeneralise and (notwithstanding the South Asian background of its foremost progenitors) constitute a form of Western cultural imperialism. Cultural practices are not justified purely by existing, nor are cultures consensual and fixed; so discussion of values is appropriate. In such discussion, support for human development values appears widespread in all countries. The approach aims to provide the bases for competent choice by each person, including for choices to follow tradition; rather than undermining diversity, she argues, it supports it.

The Human Development approach as a policy movement: in search of partners and priorities 

The attempt to convert a humanist ethical orientation into an operational development policy approach that makes an impact—on human development—leads this stream of work in various directions. First come reporting and analysis, in the annual global reports, human development indexes, national and regional reports (http://hdr.undp.org/reports/), and the work of the Human Development and Capability Association (www.capabilityapproach.com). The indexes make no claim to be comprehensive representations of human development. The plurality of diverse relevant values means no single index can suffice. The indexes’ role, successfully fulfilled, is instead to show relevant contrasts. The Human Development Index in particular serves to vividly underline the unreliability of GNP per capita as a well-being measure.

Second, to complement and prioritise across the vast landscape of human development objectives, Haq added the ‘human security’ theme. It has been best elaborated by Sen and others in the 2003 study Human Security Now. It stresses stability of capabilities; and it prioritises truly basic functionings, to be guaranteed accessible for everyone, as human rights. In particular it gives high priority to ‘freedom from fear’, for intrinsic reasons and because physical violence and insecurity have such ramifying negative effects. The Millennium Development Goals (the topic of the HDR 2003) are an attempt to commit governments worldwide to progress on these basic entitlements for all: by setting simple goals that can capture public attention and bring continuing pressure on governments, and by converting the goals into specific indicators and targets, against which governments and agencies in poor and rich countries can be held accountable; while providing space for country-specific variations. The MDGs are only one possible way of operationalising and prioritising a human development approach. It is technically crude but with a posited political rationale which is in the process of being tested. 
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